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ABSTRACT
The military supply chain must explore initiatives to improve its ability to meet warfighter 
needs. One initiative, developed during operations in Afghanistan and Iraq is the pure pallet 
process—by consolidating material early in the supply chain into user-specific pallets, these 
pallets are able to transit the defense transportation system without being broken down en 
route, theoretically arriving to the warfighter in less time than prior break-bulk methods 
required. The pure pallet initiative’s effectiveness and efficiency was assessed by measuring 
customer requisition wait time, cargo throughput, and revenue performance. It was found 
that effectiveness increased, without corresponding losses in efficiency.
BACKGROUND
Initial analyses show that the defense 
transportation system has not yet fully learned 
the logistics lessons of the 1991 Gulf War. A 
December 2003 Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) report investigating the 
preliminary effectiveness of Operation Enduring 
Freedom identified what it termed as 
“substantial logistics support problems” (Solis
2003). In particular, the GAO identified
“[insufficient and ineffective theater distribution 
capability” as a major problem. They state “[t]he 
distribution of supplies was also delayed because 
cargo arriving in shipping containers and pallets 
had to be separated and repackaged several 
times for delivery to multiple units in different 
locations” (Solis, 2003, p. 3).
In 1993, the defense transportation system 
stakeholders also recognized that improvements 
to the supply chain were critical to expedite the
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flow of material to the warfighter and to relieve 
congestion at the aerial ports of debarkation 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom (Kuntz, 2004). 
Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, improvements 
in the supply chain focused primarily on the link 
between the factory and the ports of debarkation. 
The rapid movements by combat forces during 
the Iraq war taught military logisticians the 
critical need to streamline the flow from the 
debarkation ports to the warfighter—“the last 
tactical mile” as well (Bivona et al., 2004, p. 76).
Establishing the Pure Pallet Process
In July 2003, a Defense Distribution Center 
representative visited Kuwait to reviewr Central 
Command’s distribution system and assist in 
identifying areas of improvement. It was 
discovered that the method employed to 
consolidate material and build pallets in the 
U.S.-based consolidation and containerization 
points was creating a substantial backlog of 
pallets upon arrival at the debarkation ports and 
theater distribution center due to the high 
volume of material and excessive handling 
requirements of pallets arriving into the theater. 
An important consequence of the saturation was 
the substantial increase in the warfighter’s wait 
time for supplies at the “point of the spear” 
(Hornung, 2004). A more alarming concern was 
that soldiers were unnecessarily being placed in 
harm’s way—the process of breaking down, 
sorting, and rebuilding pallets made soldiers 
vulnerable to attack (Diamond, 2004; Imberi, 
2004; Merriweather, 2005).
In October 2003, Defense Distribution Center 
staff sponsored a meeting among the defense 
transportation system supply chain stake­
holders. The team determined that requisitioned 
material should be held as far back in the supply 
chain as possible where the infrastructure was in 
place to efficiently hold and consolidate it. The 
ideal locations to position the cargo were 
determined to be the U.S.-based containerization 
points: the Defense Distribution Depot Susque­
hanna, the Defense Distribution Depot Red 
River, and the Defense Distribution Depot San 
Joaquin (Hornung, 2004).
The team also elected to build the consolidated 
material at the containerization points into end- 
user specific pallets called pure pallets. By 
consolidating material into pure pallets, the 
material would flow to the warfighter without 
being broken-down en route. This is unlike the 
historical process, which was based on break- 
bulk pallets that were broken down in-theater 
and the material sorted and re-palletized before 
being moved forward to the warfighter (Kuntz,
2004). This new approach seemed logical—the 
open desert environment and chronic lack of 
personnel certified to build air pallets made the 
theater distribution centers better suited for 
pallet cross-docking than for break-bulk 
activities and pallet construction.
Air Mobility Command’s Air Transportation 
Division planners then defined a pure pallet as 
“...a pallet, which contains only shipments for 
the end-users at a single military destination. 
They also realized that certain low-volume 
destinations would be inefficient. Therefore they 
stipulated that in some instances the historical 
approach could be used, by combining specific 
users with a designated single or lead 
destination. Pallets constructed in this way are 
said to be mixed pallets. Pallets were to be 
capped when sufficient cargo was available to fill 
the pallet, or when the oldest piece of cargo 
reached a hold time of 48 hours.
In November 2003 the pure pallet process was 
placed into action at the Susquehanna depot. In 
support of Central Command’s route plan, 
Susquehanna established 47 pure pallet build 
lanes to service 47 associated destinations. In 
addition, the Army’s maximum allowable cargo 
hold time was increased from 48 hours to 120 
hours and the Marine Corps’ cargo hold time wras 
increased from 48 hours to 72 hours (Hornung, 
2004). It was assumed that the increased cargo 
collection time would allow a sufficient volume of 
cargo to flow into the consolidation points to 
enable the pure pallets to meet or exceed the 
ideal 1.5 ton pallet weight previously established 
by regulations (Air Mobility Command, 2001).
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In February 2004, the pure pallet process was 
expanded to include pure pallet construction at 
Charleston and Dover Air Force bases (Hornung, 
2004). These aerial ports were ideal due to their 
location in the defense transportation system 
supply chain, which allowed them to collect and 
consolidate Central Command-destined material 
that had bypassed the containerization points. 
This initiative is still new and is continuing to 
evolve rapidly. While the initial assessments 
were positive, they were largely based on 
opinion. The research goal was therefore to 
objectively study the process, using specific 
criteria for effectiveness (requisition wait time) 




When considering the challenges facing the 
defense transportation system, it is easy to 
assume that it should operate much like its 
commercial counterparts. Upon closer investiga­
tion, several key differences are readily 
identifiable. A paper by the University of Penn­
sylvania’s Wharton School notes that the 
military supply chain can be categorized as three 
distinct chains, involving commodities, major 
components and people (Wharton, 2003). The 
Wharton paper also highlights the seriousness of 
military supply—a retail outlet may suffer lost 
sales if supply runs out but in the military, 
soldiers can be killed if their on-hand stocks of 
fuel or munitions are exhausted. Some principal 
differences between commercial transportation 
and its defense counterpart follow.
Scale and Size
In Fiscal Year 2004, Air Mobility Command 
moved approximately 1.15 billion pounds 
(Derick, 2005), while FedEx shipped 1.2 billion 
packages amounting to more than 3.9 billion 
pounds during the same timeframe (Federal 
Express, 2004). Where the average FedEx 
package weighs approximately 3 pounds, Air 
Mobility Command often moves much heavier 
items. Furthermore, commercial companies such
as FedEx and UPS limit their maximum pallet 
weights to approximately 2,200 pounds (Federal 
Express, 2004), while the Air Mobility Command 
Weekly Summary Reports indicate that their 
average pallet weighs between 3,000 and 5,000 
pounds. Finally, Air Mobility Command must be 
equally adept at moving non-palletized cargo 
such as rolling stock, where the commercial 
companies need not be.
Predictability and Volatility
The defense transportation system challenge is 
not one of volume as much as of being able to 
meet the unpredictability and volatility brought 
about by global events. Companies such as 
FedEx and UPS are concerned with steady 
growth and profitability as goals that are 
realized by increasing efficiency, productivity, 
and market share (Robbins et al., 2004, p. 11). 
While the defense transportation system is also 
concerned with efficiency, it is more important 
that the system be able to respond to a large 
uncertainty of demand and be able to meet the 
needs of the warfighters, regardless of 
profitability. Robbins and his colleagues note 
that “The defense distribution system must 
deliver to places that profit-maximizing 
commercial firms might never visit, and it must 
procure and hold low-demand items that would 
never be cost-justified in the commercial sector” 
(Robhins et ah, 2004, p. 12).
Commercial “Rainbow” Pallets vs. the 
Military Pure Pallet
The commercial mixed pallet, also known as a 
rainbow pallet, provides multiple products to a 
single customer on a single pallet (Schultz, 2003, 
p. 2). Rainbow pallets were developed because 
merchandisers demanded more frequent de­
liveries and bought smaller quantities, delivered 
to their door on a just-in-time basis. This 
requirement has become more widespread to 
include most industries serving the retail trades, 
resulting in intense pressure to “do or die” 
(Hammond, 1999, p. 2).
By purchasing “the right amount of goods”, 
which is usually less than a full pallet, the
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merchandiser customer is not required to 
maintain additional warehouse space to store 
excess product. Their challenge is to determine 
whether the increased transportation cost of 
more frequent deliveries outweighs the cost of 
excessive inventory and warehousing if rainbow 
pallets are not used. In contrast, the pure pallet 
process designers must consider more than just 
the velocity at which material reaches the 
warfighter. The pure pallet process must also 
accommodate the proper balance between 
process effectiveness (i.e., velocity), and process 
efficiency (i.e., acceptable use of scarce 
transportation assets). For example, standard 
commercial shipping pallets are typically low 
cost wooden items that can be easily obtained. 
Furthermore, the transportation assets 
themselves—typically trucks—are also widely 
available. Distributors can secure additional 
trucking if necessary, and the customer needs 
only to accept the additional cost as a tradeoff for 
velocity. In contrast, military airlift aircraft and 
pallets are scarce, and wartime pallet attrition is 
significant. Peterson notes that of the more than
180.000 standard “463-L” military airlift pallets 
available prior to September 2001, only about
85.000 were accounted for by December 2004. 
The pallets themselves are costly to buy and 
maintain: the Air Force spent almost $24 million 
for 463-L pallet repairs in 2004 (Peterson, 2005, 
p. 31).
The pure pallet concept is similar to the 
commercial industry’s rainbow pallet, in that the 
defense transportation system must also balance 
tradeoffs of velocity versus transportation cost, 
warehousing space, and inventory. The key 
difference is that the pure pallet process is made 
considerably more complicated by the additional 
constraints of limited airlift assets.
Before explaining the research methodology, a 
brief discussion of effectiveness and efficiency 
metrics is necessary. To measure defense 
transportation system effectiveness, requisition 
wait time—the time that elapses from an item’s 
order to the date it is received—was a clear 
choice (see e.g., Solis, 2005, p. 19). To assess 
efficiency, the measure used is cargo throughput,
in terms of both pallet loading and aircraft 
usage. The hypothesis was that the time 
criterion for capping pure pallets would lead to 
lighter average pallet loads, which in turn would 
lead to lighter, less efficient aircraft loads. Pallet 
weight computations would be straightforward 
due to the standard 463-L pallet specification, 
but a corresponding aircraft usage metric was 
needed that could be readily applied across the 
multiple aircraft types used by Air Mobility 
Command. Fortunately, Air Mobility Command 
already uses precisely such an efficiency 
measure: the percent Transportation Working 
Capital Fund (% TWCF) goal.
The Transportation Working Capital 
Fund (TWCF)
Title IV, Section 405, of the National Security 
Act of 1947, Working Capital Funds, authorizes 
the use of revolving accounts to finance certain 
commercial-type activities in the Department of 
Defense. Airlift services reimbursement is 
received by the TWCF from authorized airlift 
customers by charging tariffs based on the type 
of airlift service provided. These tariffs are 
developed by U.S. Transportation Command 
planners and approved by the Undersecretary of 
Defense, Comptroller, through the President’s 
Budget Cycle. Revenues earned by the TWCF 
recoup direct and indirect costs, general and 
administrative support provided by others, 
depreciation, and amortization costs incurred by 
Air Mobility Command in providing airlift 
services (Air Mobility Command, 2004, p. 7).
TWCF airlift tariffs for routine passengers and 
cargo are set annually based on commercial 
competition or a standard rate per mile. As a 
result, the TWCF doesn’t recover full costs due to 
Air Mobility Command’s requirement to main­
tain the wartime capacity of the airlift system. 
The difference between the revenue that the 
TWCF receives and the costs incurred for these 
airlift services is offset by an Air Force 
operations and maintenance-funded readiness 
account (Air Mobility Command, 2004, p. 8).
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Air Mobility Command’s Financial Management 
and Comptroller division determines the stan­
dard aircraft usage level for passengers and 
cargo to meet the Transportation Working Fund 
Goal. The goal is for the Air Force to provide a 
service to the customer cheaper than they can 
buy it commercially. In order to remain com­
petitive the Air Force accepts some financial loss 
on each flight. The TWCF goal is set to defer 
most, but not all of the cost (Hobin, 2005). For 
example, in March 2005 the percent TWCF goal 
was 49.8% for passengers and 63.3% for cargo 
(Hobin, 2005). Therefore in March 2005, if an 
airlift aircraft was loaded to 63.3% of its cargo 
capacity, then it met its TWCF goal. When Air 
Mobility Command exceeds the TWCF goal, then 
they are operating cheaper than their com­
mercial competition and they are operating 
efficiently by exceeding the expected TWCF 
input (Hobin, 2005).
METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS
To examine pure pallet impacts to defense 
transportation system efficiency and effective­
ness, a case study of airlift-based material 
support to Central Command was conducted, 
comparing pre-pure pallet throughput (denoted 
as “historical” throughput) versus pure pallet 
throughput into the Central Command theater. 
Requisition wait time, average pallet weight and 
percent Transportation Capital Working Fund 
(%TWCF) goal-per-mission metrics were used to 
compare historical (March 2003-February 2004) 
pallet data to pure pallet (March 2004—January
2005) data.
Qualitative sources included published 
interviews and communications with military 
personnel involved in pure pallet implementa­
tion. Quantitative data sources included the 
RAND DOD-wide distribution database (for 
requisition wait time), Air Mobility Command’s 
Weekly Summaries for the Charleston and Dover 
Air Force Base aerial ports (for pallet weights), 
and Air Mobility Command’s Tanker Airlift 
Control Center end-of-month reports for Charles­
ton and Dover Air Force Bases (for % TWCF 
goal). This article focused on the Dover and
Charleston aerial ports because virtually all 
Central Command-designated pure pallets 
transit these two ports.
Requisition Wait Time
Figure 1 shows how the monthly pure pallet 
mean requisition wait times compare to the 
historical method, for cargo palletized at Dover 
or Charleston (denoted as “MILAIR” pallets). 
Figure 2 depicts the same information, for cargo 
palletized by the Defense Logistics Agency at the 
Susquehanna, Red River, or San Joaquin depots 
(denoted as “MILALOC” pallets). To ensure an 
accurate picture is presented, the tonnage of 
material transported into the Central Command 
theater is also shown in each figure, as is the 
Army’s maximum 20-day requisition wait time 
goal. The associated data is shown in the 
Appendix. Note that for the Central Command 
MILAIR requisition wait times, the historical 
mean and median were 35.2 days and 30.1 days, 
respectively, while the pure pallet initiative 
mean and median values were 31.3 and 25.5 
days, respectively. Using a two-sample t-test 
assuming unequal variance, it was found that 
the difference in mean requisition wait times is 
statistically significant (p = 0.048). Average 
monthly cargo throughput was about 10,500 tons 
across both timeframes.
Figure 2 shows that the historical mean and 
median Central Command MILALOC requisition 
wait times were 27.6 days and 23 days, 
respectively, while the corresponding pure pallet 
initiative mean and median values decreased to 
23.5 and 19.8 days. The difference in mean 
requisition wait times is statistically significant 
(p = 0.006). Average monthly volume was again 
about 10,500 tons across the entire period. 
Similar findings were reported in a GAO report 
by Solis from data collected since February 2005 
(Solis, 2005). These trends suggest that the pure 
pallet initiative is helping to reduce Central 
Command customer wait time.
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FIGURE 1
REQUISITION WAIT TIME, PALLETS BUILT AT DOVER OR CHARLESTON
FIGURE 2
REQUISITION WAIT TIME,
PALLETS BUILT BY SUSQUEHANNA, RED RIVER, OR SAN JOAQUIN DEPOTS
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Pure Pallet Weight
Figure 3 compares the average pallet tonnage for 
Dover AFB both before and after pure pallet 
implementation. The Missions numbers were 
generated from the reported data for the three 
primary airlift assets, the C-5, C-17, and the 
B747 as shown in the Appendix, records 1 
through 4, 9 and 10. Figure 4 provides similar 
insights for Charleston AFB—the associated 
data is in the Appendix, records 5 through 8, 11 
and 12.
Dover Throughput. The historical average 
Dover AFB pallet weighed 1.4 tons, but 
increased to an average of 1.76 tons for port-built 
(MILA1R) pure pallets. The MILALOC pure 
pallets transiting Dover averaged 1.6 tons. 
Taken together, Dover MILAIR and MILALOC 
pure pallets averaged 1.68 tons. The difference 
in mean tonnage, historical versus combined 
MILAIR and MILALOC pallets, is statistically 
significant (p = 0.0004). The average number of 
airlift missions through Dover AFB was 107 per 
month during the historical period, but 
decreased slightly to 102 per month during the 
pure pallet period.
Charleston Throughput. MILAIR pallets built 
at Charleston increased from 1.9 tons average 
weight to 2.13 tons after pure pallet implementa­
tion. The MILALOC pure pallet weight averaged 
1.73 tons. Overall, MILAIR and MILALOC pure 
pallets together averaged 1.93 tons per pallet.
Charleston averaged about 139 Central Com­
mand airlift missions per month during the 
historical period, but dropped to 105 per month 
during the pure pallet timeframe. Note that 
while the difference in mean tonnage, historical 
versus MILAIR pallets is statistically significant 
(p = 0.017), the difference in mean tonnage, 
historical versus combined MILAIR and 
MILALOC pallets is not (p = 0.33).
In summary, the pure pallet process appears to 
be helping increase average pallet weight—at 
the least, average pallet weight has not declined 
since the process was adopted. One might argue 
that the pure pallet initiative is affecting the 
number of monthly airlift missions, given their 
decrease during the study period, but this is 
unlikely. Too many other factors are also 
involved, such as competition for airlift aircraft 
for other missions, poor weather, and customer 
demand.
Percent TWCF Revenue Performance
Figures 5 and 6 compare the average %TWCF 
per month for Dover and Charleston Air Force 
Bases before and after pure pallet implementa­
tion. Both the missions and the %TWCF were 
generated from the reported data for the three 
primary airlift assets, the C-5, C-17, and the 
B747. The Appendix contains the applicable 
statistical measurements: refer to records 9, 10, 
13, and 14 for Figure 5, and records 11, 12, 15, 
and 16 for Figure 6.
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FIGURE 3
AVERAGE PALLET WEIGHT 
DOVER AIR FORCE BASE
FIGURE 4
AVERAGE PALLET WEIGHT, CHARLESTON AIR FORCE BASE
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FIGURE 5
AVERAGE PERCENT TRANSPORTATION WORKING 
CAPITAL FUND REVENUES, DOVER AIR FORCE BASE
FIGURE 6
AVERAGE PERCENT TRANSPORTATION WORKING CAPITAL FUND REVENUES,
CHARLESTON AIR FORCE BASE
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During the March 2003-February 2004 historical 
period, Dover AFB averaged 106.7 percent 
TWCF revenues per month, but increased to an 
average 112.5 percent after pure pallet imple­
mentation. The statistical significance between 
the historical versus pure pallet %TWCF 
revenue performance is somewhat weak (p = 
0.076). In contrast, Charleston AFB averaged 
143.1% TWCF during the historical period, but 
declined slightly to 137% TWCF after the pure 
pallet process was initiated. This difference is 
statistically significant (p = 0.045). Overall, there 
appears to be a mild negative impact on the 
%TWCF revenue per mission. However, the 
%TWCF revenue continued to easily exceed the 
Air Mobility Command goal after the pure pallet 
process was implemented.
CONCLUSIONS
Pure pallet process implementation appears not 
to have reduced the defense transportation 
system’s efficiency in the Central Command area 
of responsibility and in most circumstances is 
correlated with improved system effectiveness. 
The defense transportation system might never 
be fully optimized, but by continuing to imple­
ment ground-breaking initiatives along with 
lessons learned from commercial industry, the 
Department of Defense is making strides toward 
becoming a truly seamless end-to-end supply 
chain.
This research has shown that the pure pallet 
concept is correlated with increased velocity of 
material to Central Command warfighters, at
minimal impact to transportation system 
efficiency. However, pure pallets are probably 
not a panacea for all military material distribu­
tion situations. For example, pure pallets 
increase the workload in the earlier stages of the 
supply chain (Robb, 2004, p. 22). Therefore, in 
situations such as a stable theater with a mature 
logistics system in a non-combat environment, 
the trade-off between velocity and increased 
workload may not be acceptable, such as in non- 
military sectors. It does, however, have potential 
application in disaster response situations.
Future research will investigate pallet attrition 
and retrograde issues, which was a significant 
challenge before the pure pallet concept was 
initiated. The pure pallet concept may be 
exacerbating the problem—during historical 
breakbulk pallet operations, the pallets would be 
broken down at the points of debarkation and 
the material loaded on trucks for delivery to the 
warfighters, leaving the 463-L airlift pallets and 
associated netting for return to the U.S. In 
contrast, the pure pallet concept pushes the 
airlift pallets much closer to the warfighter, 
rendering pallet retrograde more difficult.
Other research will address the 72 and 120-hour 
hold times that were established early in the 
pure pallet process formation, with little or no 
available data. Sufficient data now exists to 
determine optimal hold times. Hopefully, these 
hold times can be reduced without system 
efficiency impacts.
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APPENDIX
STATISTICAL SUMMARIES
Pallet Tonnage Historical (DOV
1 Mar 03 - Feb 04)
Pallet Tonnage Historical
5 (CHS Mar 03 - Feb 04)
Missions Pre-Pure Pallet (DOV
9 Mar 03 - Feb 04)
% 7WCF Pre-Pure Pallet (DOV
13 Mar 03 - Feb 04)
Mean 1 40 Mean 1 90 Mean 107 Mean 106 7
Standard Error 0 04 Standard Error 0 04 Standard Error 7 Standard Error 2 9
Median 1 44 Median 1 86 Median 100 Median 108 1
Mode #N/A Mode #N/A Mode 120 Mode #N/A
Standard Deviation 0 14 Standard Deviationi 0 14 Standard Deviation 23 Standard Deviation 10 0
Sample Variance 0 02 Sample Variance 0 02 Sample Vanance 509 Sample Variance 99 9
Kurtosis 0 05 Kurtosis -0 36 Kurtosis 0 Kurtosis 0 8
Skewness 0 06 Skewness 0 96 Skewness 1 Skewness -0 4
Range 0 49 Range 0 41 Range 78 Range 38 2
Minimum 1 19 Minimum 1 74 Minimum 77 Minimum 86 6
Maximum 1 67 Maximum 2 16 Maximum 155 Maximum 124 7
Sum 16 85 Sum 22.76 Sum 1287 Sum 1280 2
Count 12 Count 12 Count 12 Count 12
Pallet Tonnage Port F*ure (DOV Pallet Tonnage Port Built Pure Missions Post-Pure Pallet %TWCF Post-Pure Pallet (DOV
! Mar 04 - Jan 05) 6 (CHS Mar 04 - Jan 05) 10 (DOV Mar 04 ■ Jan 05) 14 Mar 04 ■ Jan 05)
Mean 1 76 Mean 2.13 Mean 102 Mean 112 5
Standard Error 0 11 Standard Error 0.09 Standard Error 5 Standard Error 2 7
Median 1 71 Median 2 11 Median 100 Median 110 9
Mode #N/A Mode #N/A Mode #N/A Mode #N/A
Standard Deviation 0 37 Standard Deviation 0.30 Standard Deviation 17 Standard Deviation 8 9
Sample Vanance 0.14 Sample Variance 0 09 Sample Variance 274 Sample Vanance 79 0
Kurtosis -1 30 Kurtosis 0 79 Kurtosis 1 Kurtosis 1.2
Skewness 0 14 Skewness 0.31 Skewness 0 Skewness 0 8
Range 1 02 Range 1 05 Range 61 Range 32 0
Minimum 1.25 Minimum 1 67 Minimum 72 Minimum 99 6
Maximum 2 27 Maximum 2 72 Maximum 133 Maximum 131 6
Sum 19 31 Sum 23 40 Sum 1119 Sum 1237 7
Count 11 Count 11 Count 11 Count 11
Pallet Tonnage MILALOC Pallet Tonnage MILALOC Missions Pre-Pure Pallet (CHS % TWCF Pre-Pure Pallet (CHS
\ (DOV Mar 04- Jan 05) 7 (CHS Mar 04 - Jan 05) 11 Mar 03 - Feb 04) 15 Mar 03 - Feb 04)
Mean 1 60 Mean 1 73 Mean 139 Mean 143 1
Standard Error 0 04 Standard Error 0 05 Standard Error 8 Standard Error 2 2
Median 1 64 Median 1 77 Median 142 Median 142 8
Mode 1 64 Mode 1 86 Mode 127 Mode #N/A
Standard Deviation 0 15 Standard Deviation 0 15 Standard Deviation 29 Standard Deviation 7 7
Sample Vanance 0 02 Sample Variance 0 02 Sample Variance 847 Sample Vanance 58 7
Kurtosis 0.24 Kurtosis -0.16 Kurtosis 2 Kurtosis -06
Skewness -0 81 Skewness -1.01 Skewness 1 Skewness 02
Range 0 48 Range 0 41 Range 113 Range 26 2
Minimum 1.30 Minimum 1 46 Minimum 92 Minimum 130 8
Maximum 1 78 Maximum 1 87 Maximum 205 Maximum 157 0
Sum 17 60 Sum 19 01 Sum 1667 Sum 17172
Count 11 Count 11 Count 12 Count 12
Average Pure Pallet Tonnage Average Pure Pallet Tonange Missions Post-Pure Pallet XTWCF Post-Pure Pallet (CHS
(DOV Mar 04 - Jan 05) 8 (CHS Mar 04 -,Jan 05) 12 (CHS Mar 04 - Jan 05) 16 Mar 04 - Jan 05)
Mean 1 68 Mean 1 93 Mean 105 Mean 137 0
Standard Error 0 06 Standard Error 0 07 Standard Error 4 Standard Error 26
Median 1 66 Median 1 86 Median 107 Median 139 8
Mode 1 48 Mode 1 69 Mode #N/A Mode #N/A
Standard Deviation 0 29 Standard Deviation 0 31 Standard Deviation 13 Standard Deviation 8.7
Sample Vanance 0 08 Sample Variance 0.10 Sample Variance 176 Sample Vanance 75 6
Kurtosis 0 19 Kurtosis 0 78 Kurtosis 0 Kurtosis -0 7
Skewness 0 68 Skewness 0 78 Skewness -1 Skewness -0.2
Range 1 02 Range 1.26 Range 42 Range 292
Minimum 1.25 Minimum 1 46 Minimum 77 Minimum 121 7
Maximum 2.27 Maximum 2 72 Maximum 119 Maximum 150 9
Sum 36 91 Sum 42 41 Sum 1157 Sum 1507 0
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